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Quantum key distribution based on private states:
unconditional security over untrusted channels with
zero quantum capacity
Karol Horodecki, Micha l Horodecki, Pawe l Horodecki, Debbie Leung, and Jonathan Oppenheim
Abstract—
We prove unconditional security for a quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) protocol based on distilling pbits (twisted
ebits) [1] from an arbitrary untrusted state that is claimed
to contain distillable key. Our main result is that we can
verify security using only public communication – via pa-
rameter estimation of the given untrusted state. The tech-
nique applies even to bound entangled states, thus extend-
ing QKD to the regime where the available quantum channel
has zero quantum capacity. We also show how to convert
our purification-based QKD schemes to prepare-measure
schemes.
I. Background, problem, and result
A large class of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) pro-
tocols are based on entanglement-purification-protocols
(EPP). We use the shorthand EPP-QKD for these pro-
tocols. It is known that a secure key can be obtained by
locally measuring two systems prepared in some maximally
entangled state (also known as EPR pairs [2] or ebits). The
security and working principle of EPP-QKD are based on
the ability of two separated parties to estimate error rates
of an untrusted shared state relative to ebits and to sub-
sequently distill ebits. In [1], it was found that the most
general quantum state (known to the users) which provides
a secure key (after measurement) is not an ebit. It is called
a pbit or “twisted ebits.” These pbits can likewise be dis-
tilled or purified from known shared states. This paper
is focused on the scenario when the users share untrusted
states, and how to devise QKD schemes under such cir-
cumstances based on pbit-purification-protocols. We call
these protocols PPP-QKD. The main goal is to devise an
analoguous error estimation scheme relative to pbits, using
only public classical communication. The scheme applies
to some “bound entangled” initial states that are nonethe-
less sufficiently close to pbits. (A state is bound entan-
gled if no ebits can be distilled from many copies of it.)
Consequently, there are channels that cannot be used to
send quantum information (zero quantum capacity), but
that can be used for QKD (nonzero key capacity). Fur-
thermore, in spirit similar to [3], we provide a recipe for
converting PPP-QKD to their associated prepare-measure
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schemes (P/M-QKD ). We will concentrate on the verifi-
cation scheme of Lo, Chau, and Ardehali [4], [5] where bit
and phase error rates are estimated. We instead estimate
“twisted” bit and phase error rates. Our proof uses classi-
cal random sampling theory, and the exponential quantum
de Finetti theorem [6].
We first provide a pedagogical review on the essential con-
cepts of QKD in Sec. I-A. Readers familiar with QKD can
skip the review. We then discuss the current problem in
Sec. I-B followed by a precise statement of our results in
Sec. I-D as well as related results in Sec. I-E. The proof of
security is contained in Sec. II with the essence of it being
in Sec. II-D. We follow this up by a discussion on how
to convert our protocol to a P/M-QKD scheme in Sec. III
and give an example of QKD using a binding-entanglement-
channel in Sec. IV where the error rate is so high that quan-
tum capacity vanishes. An interesting observation that the
users will not need to know about what private state they
share and how to exploit this fact are given in Sec. VI. We
have built our protocols piece by piece, and a summary of
the complete protocols is given in Sec. V. We conclude
with other remarks and a discussion of open problems in
Sec. VII. Proofs are detailed in the Appendix, and the
theorems are restated in the body of the paper.
A. Review of quantum key distribution (QKD)
In the quantum world, it is generally impossible to extract
information about a quantum state without disturbing it
[7]. This principle enables unconditionally secure key dis-
tribution that is impossible classically. Key distribution is
the task of establishing a key between two parties, Alice
and Bob. Informally, a key distribution protocol is secure
if the probability to establish a compromised key vanishes.
(In the above statement, we have allowed the key length to
vary and when it is zero, the protocol “aborts”. See also
[8].) If a protocol (given some stated resources) is secure
against the most powerful adversary (Eve) limited only by
laws of physics, its security is “unconditional.”
In QKD, Alice and Bob can use a quantum channel (from
Alice to Bob) and classical channels (in both directions).
These can be noisy and controlled by Eve. In addition, Al-
ice and Bob have local coins and in some cases, quantum
computers. These can be noisy but they are not controlled
by Eve. Finally, Alice and Bob share a small initial key. Us-
ing the quantum universal composability result [9], most of
the imperfect resources can be made near-perfect while pre-
2serving security – the classical channels and local resources
can be made reliable and authenticated using the initial
key and coding. We make these simplifying assumptions
from now on, and focus on imperfections in the quantum
channel. (As a side remark, for arbitrary adversarial im-
perfections in the quantum channel, no coding method can
convert it to a perfect quantum channel. Fortunately, QKD
requires less (see above) and this paper revolves around the
minimal requirement on the quantum channel.)
We first give the intuition behind the security offered by
quantum mechanics assuming a noiseless quantum channel.
Alice and Bob pre-agree on a set of non-orthogonal quan-
tum states, each may be transmitted by Alice through the
quantum channel with some probabilities. (This is the case
in the earliest QKD scheme called BB84 [10].) Eve can in-
tercept and compromise the quantum signals but they will
be disturbed. Bob tells Alice when he receives the states,
and they subsequently detect disturbance using some of the
states, and if they observe none, they extract a key from
the rest of the states; otherwise, they abort the protocol.
QKD based on noisy channels is important for two reasons.
First, natural noise is inevitable and can be used by an
eavesdropper as a disguise. Second, it is desirable to be
able to generate a key despite some malicious attack. Initial
work [11], [12] was done based on error estimation, privacy
amplification [13], and error correction. Mayers first gave
an unconditional security proof for QKD [14], showing that
BB84 can provide a key up to ≈ 8% observed error.
Later on, Lo and Chau [4] reported a security proof for
a different QKD scheme based on E91 [15] – Alice and
Bob first share some noisy, untrusted state ?ρ. (We tag the
state with a “question mark” to emphasize that the users
cannot ascertain its identity.) It is supposed to be n copies
of |Φd〉 := 1√d
∑d
i=1 |i〉A|i〉B where {|i〉} is a computational
basis for the local systems A and B possessed by Alice and
Bob respectively. |Φd〉 is called a “maximally entangled
state” or MES for short. When d = 2 it is also called
an EPR pair or “ebit”. ?ρ arises from Alice preparing n
local copies of |Φd〉 and transmitting Bob’s shares through
an untrusted channel of d dimensions. Eve can attack on
all n systems jointly. For now, we focus on the d = 2
case (just like [4]). After Bob receives the state, Alice and
Bob extract a smaller number m of nearly perfect ebits,
from which a key is obtained by measuring in the local
computational basis. It is possible for m = 0, when QKD
is aborted. The Lo-Chau proof is simple – however the
noise arises, just detect and remove it, and doing so only
involves standard techniques in entanglement purification
protocols (EPP) or distillation [16].
The disadvantage of the Lo-Chau proof is that, its asso-
ciated scheme requires quantum storage and coherent ma-
nipulation of quantum data, neither of which is required
in BB84. Shor and Preskill [3] provided a recipe to relate
BB84 to the E91-Lo-Chau scheme, such that the security
of the former is implied by that of the latter. Furthermore,
[3] generalizes to many other variants of BB84 (collectively
called “prepare-measure” scheme P/M-QKD ) so that their
security can be proved via that of a related purification-
based QKD scheme.
B. Step-by-step QKD and motivation of current problem
We discuss useful general concepts by interpreting the Lo-
Chau scheme [4] as follows. Alice and Bob preagree on a
set of parameters e for states, and let sets of states shar-
ing the same parameters be labeled as Se. (It will be clear
later how they should be chosen.) The protocol is a 4-step
process for Alice and Bob:
(1) Distribute an untrusted bipartite state ?ρ using the un-
trusted resources.
(2) Perform tests (via public discussion) on ?ρ such that if
?ρ ∈ Se, the test will output e with high probability.
They only need to know which e (or Se) but not which
?ρ,
and the remaining procedure depends only on e and applies
to all states in Se. For example, in the Lo-Chau scheme,
e consists of two error rates (bit and phase), Se is the set
of states arising from inflicting errors of rates e to the Bell
states (see Def. 1 and Eq. (3) towards the end of Sec. II-A
for a precise definition).
(3) Based on the parameter e, apply an appropriate EPP
to ?ρ and output a state γ˜.
This procedure, if applied to any state in Se, will return
a state γ˜ which is a good approximation of a known and
trusted state γ (e.g. ebits in E91/Lo-Chau).
(4) Generate a key by measuring γ˜ locally.
The key can have varying size (depends on e), and zero
key-length means “abort QKD.”
We will refer to these 4 steps (and their variations) repeat-
edly throughout the paper.
To generalize the Lo-Chau scheme, we examine the require-
ments for each of these steps (in reverse order).
We start with step (4): Simply suppose Alice and
Bob share a known and trusted state γ. What γ
(other than |Φd〉) will generate a secure key? Refer-
ence [1] characterizes all such γ (up to local unitaries on A
and B):
γUd = U(ΦdAB ⊗ ρA′B′)U † (1)
U =
∑
ij
|ij〉〈ij|AB ⊗ UijA′B′ (2)
where Φd = |Φd〉〈Φd| is the MES of local dimension d, the
subscripts AA′ and BB′ denote systems held by Alice and
Bob, Uij are unitary so that U is also unitary, and ρA′B′
is any state (pure or mixed) of some arbitrary dimension
d′. (Note that dim(γUd ) = d
2d′ and the key generated has
size log d.) U in Eq. (2) is called the twisting operator, and
any γUd given by Eq. (1) is called a pdit (or private state,
or twisted state or gamma state). In some sense, Eq. (1)
and Eq. (2) characterize all the noise on an MES that is
harmless for the purpose of generating a key. We state this
property for the twisting operator U more precisely.
Observation 1: (See [1], [17]) Let U be any twisting opera-
tor, and consider any two states ρAA′BB′ , σAA′BB′ related
3by σAA′BB′ = UρAA′BB′U
†. Let both be purified by E.
(See definition in Sec. II-B right before Eq. (4).) Then, if
Alice and Bob measure A and B in the computational ba-
sis, the reduced states on ABE, ρ˜ABE and σ˜ABE , are the
same.
Such postmeasurement states are called ccq states, for Al-
ice and Bob hold classical systems, while Eve’s state re-
mains unmeasured and quantum.
Now consider step (3): Which states can be con-
verted into a good approximation of a private state
(γ)? We call such states “key distillable” (even though they
are not of tensor power form). The conversion procedure
has to work for all states in Se. A complete characteriza-
tion is unlikely to be tractable and we only have examples.
The canonical example in [4] is the set of states with suf-
ficiently low error rates relative to perfect ebits. We will
call these “ǫ-good-ebits”. These are not necessarily tensor
power or product states (see Def. 1 and Eq. (3)). Here,
EPP works for all ǫ-good-ebits independent of which one is
the initial state. Another example are tensor power states
σ⊗n. In this case, one says that a protocol achieves a “key
rate” r if it converts σ⊗n to ≈ γU2nr for some U given by
Eq. (2), allowing n to be asymptotically large. For exam-
ple, protocols and lower bounds for r are found in [18] for
general σ.
We mention some surprising facts about private states and
key-distillable states. All perfect pdits (γ) contain some
distillable entanglement. However, there are families of
pdits with vanishing amount of distillable entanglement
but can be used to provide a key with constant rate. Also,
there are states close to pdits and have distillable key (lower
bound from [18]) but have no distillable entanglement (up-
per bound from showing the positivity of the partial tran-
pose (PPT) [19], [20]).
Switching from trusted states to untrusted states, we now
move on to the main concern of this paper: In step (2),
what sets Se contain key distillable states and admit
parameter estimation? What are the correspond-
ing tests for finding if ?ρ ∈ Se? In the Lo-Chau proof,
γ are ebits and Se can be chosen to be ǫ-good-ebits (these
are states with bounded error relative to ebits, see Def. 1
and Eq. (3)). In the most general case, γ is a pdit and a
natural question is, can all key-distillable Se be tested?
We believe that the above question is hard, by considering
all possible “ǫ-good-pbits” – states obtained from applying
any twisting operation to ǫ-good-ebits, where the twisting
can act jointly on the entire system. Without further re-
striction on the joint twisting operation, it is unclear how
to perform parameter estimation on the joint state.
One particularly useful class of ǫ-good-pbits are those ob-
tained from applying tensor-power twisting U⊗n on ǫ-good-
ebits. We will call these states ⊗-twisted-ǫ-good-pbits
(note that just like ǫ-good-ebits, ⊗-twisted-ǫ-good-pbits
need not be tensor power states). (See also Def. 2.)
Prior to this work, Ref. [21] showed how to perform param-
eter estimation for Se containing ⊗-twisted-ǫ-good-pbits
that have some distillable entanglement. There, the im-
portant distinction from the Lo-Chau scheme is that, in
Ref. [21], entanglement is only distilled for parameter esti-
mation but not for the subsequent key generation. In par-
ticular, the entanglement distilled in the scheme of Ref. [21]
can be in negligible quantity compared to the key size.
But [21] leaves many questions unanswered, in particular,
whether Se can contain bound entangled but key distillable
states, and whether distilling entanglement (albeit a little)
is necessary. Also, the test in [21] prevents easy conver-
sion to a simpler class of schemes called prepare-measure
schemes (P/M-QKD, see below).
In this paper, we will show by an explicit protocol that pa-
rameter estimation is possible for all Se containing states
which can be converted into ⊗-twisted-ǫ-good-pbits by
LOCC operations (involving only local operations and pub-
lic classical communications). Furthermore, this new esti-
mation procedure does not involve distillation so that it
applies to bound entangled states; it only involves prod-
uct observables (see Def. 3), allowing easy conversion to
P/M-QKD, as we will see later.
C. Our adversarial setting
Throughout the paper, we are concerned with uncondi-
tional security of QKD, in which nothing is assumed about
the actual channel used or about the actual state shared ?ρ.
There are three separate notions that we want to mention
explicitly.
• Alice and Bob use an underlying quantum resource “a”
(a channel or quantum state) in order to execute QKD.
They have some knowledge about this resource, for exam-
ple, the natural channel loss due to their distance can be
theoretically calculated.
• During any specific execution, this resource is subject to
further unknown attack to produce the actual channel or
state ?ρ “b”. This will remain unknown to Alice and Bob
throughout.
• What is known to Alice and Bob in an execution is a set
of observed error rates “c”.
The insecurity of QKD can be quantified by the probabil-
ity that the state has been compromised more than the ob-
served error rates have suggested. Security is a consequence
of the test procedure to obtain “c”, and is independent of
any of the above.
It is a combination of the QKD protocol and the observed
error “c” that determines the actual key rate, and this de-
pends on the actual channel or state ?ρ “b”, which in turns
cannot be better than the underlying resource “a”. This is
why analysis of a QKD protocol often refer to the underly-
ing resource “a” – the protocol, starting with resource “a”
and subject to further unknown attack, will result in some
potentially worse observed error rates that may still give
the greenlight to establish a secure key. Se can be used to
describe both concepts “a” and “c”.
4To repeat, given resource “a” that is too noisy, QKD gives
zero key-rate whether there is eavesdropping or not. On
the other hand, no matter how good “a” is, too much
eavesdropping should also give a zero key-rate. So, QKD
is only interesting given good enough underlying quantum
resource “a” together with a scheme to ensure security.
The goal of this paper can be understood as characterizing
what underlying resources “a” are good enough under our
scheme.
D. Statement of results
In this paper, we report a new test procedure in step (2)
for any Se containing ⊗-twisted-ǫ-good-pbits. Since Alice
and Bob can use LOCC in QKD, our procedure also ap-
plies to any Se containing states which can be converted
into ⊗-twisted-ǫ-good-pbits by LOCC. In particular, these
include (1) ⊗-twisted-ǫ-good-pbits themselves, and (2) ten-
sor power key distillable states. This new method does not
require distilling entanglement and it applies independent
of whether Se has distillable entanglement or is bound en-
tangled.
The protocol in this paper is similar to that in [21], and is
also a “twist” from the original Lo-Chau scheme. In the
critical step of phase error estimation, we test for “twisted
phase errors” (phase errors in the basis defined by the twist-
ing operation) just as in [21]. In [21], the test is based
on entanglement distillation and teleportation. Here, our
new procedure uses a more recently found finite quantum
de Finetti theorem with exponential convergence [6] and
requires only local resources, measurement of product ob-
servables (Def. 3), and classical communication. This has
significant consequences:
(1) There are quantum channels that have zero quantum
capacity but nonzero key capacity. Each set of states Se
captures what Alice and Bob expect ?ρ to be. It summa-
rizes deviations from perfect pbits including channel noise
and noise inflicted by eavesdropping. For example, Alice
and Bob can have prior knowledge of the presumably avail-
able quantum channel (resource (a) in previous subsection),
which is susceptible to further attack by an eavesdropper.
Our work extends QKD to the regime when this presum-
ably available quantum channel cannot transmit quantum
data, and only allows sharing of a bound entangled key
distillable state at best (without an eavesdropper). With
the unknown eavesdropping attack, the final key rate de-
pends on the combined noise level, and can potentially be
positive. (In the static case, there are states that are un-
trusted and presumably bound entangled that can still give
a secure key.)
(2) Prepare-measure scheme based on private states. Re-
markably, in the noiseless case, E91 is mathematically re-
lated to many “prepare-measure” QKD schemes (P/M-
QKD) including BB84. P/M-QKD only requires quantum
states to be prepared and be sent by Alice, and be measured
by Bob without being stored, thus, minimal coherent quan-
tum manipulations. P/M-QKD has much practical advan-
tage over distillation or purification based schemes, but
the latter often have simple unconditional security proofs.
Shor and Preskill [3] illustrated mathematical connections
between the two types of schemes even in the noisy case
for some EPP. Starting from the Lo-Chau security proof,
they rederived one for BB84 similar to Mayer’s. Reference
[22] generalized the connection to more general EPP. Like-
wise, our new test procedure allows the purification-based
scheme to be transformed to a P/M-QKD. This can be
useful in implementation.
We note a side result that may be of independent interest –
that average values of an observable in a bulk system can be
estimated in a sublinear sample even when the observable
cannot be directly measured. This will be discussed more
in Section VII.
E. Related work
As already noted, this paper is a follow-up of [21] on param-
eter estimation of untrusted states relative to pbits. The
scheme in [21] requires a small amount of distillable entan-
glement – it does not apply to bound entangled states and
thus cannot be used on states generated by a channel with
zero quantum capacity.
An earlier version of the current result (unpublished) used
an exact but polynomial quantum de Finetti theorem [23]
from which we obtained a much lower key rate. The new
exponential quantum de Finetti theorem (exp-QDFT) in
[6] provides much better bounds and properties.
There are two intuitive solutions to the current problem
of parameter estimation. The first is a state-tomographic
estimation, which was suggested in [1], but the accuracy
and security was not analyzed. It is interesting to note
here that exp-QDFT provides exactly the tool for doing
so. Whatever ?ρ is, Alice and Bob can simply choose half
of the systems (or any linear amount) at random, and
the chosen state ?ρ′ is exponentially close to a mixture of
“almost-power-state.” Se can be chosen to be tensor pow-
ers of key distillable states and the test for ?ρ′ ∈ Se sim-
ply involves state tomography using only measurement of
product observables and classical communication. (During
the final preparation of the manuscript, we heard of some
work in progress using this approach [24].) This paper fol-
lows another intuitive approach – error estimation in the
twisted basis, via a decomposition of the twisted observ-
able into product observables (see Def. 3). Intriguingly, a
natural choice of the set of product observables is also to-
mographically complete. However, discarding is not neces-
sary here. The main challenge is a rigorous security proof,
along with a careful analysis of how various parameters are
related. We have used many different elements (including
the exp-QDFT) in [6], along with earlier techniques such as
quantum-classical-reduction and various random sampling
techniques, [4], [5], and also ideas from [21].
In this paper, we have also emphasized various useful con-
cepts, such as “harmless errors” and the structural con-
stituents of QKD. Examples of harmless errors (most gen-
5erally defined by the private states) was observed in earlier
works by Aschauer and Briegel [25] and was used in [26],
[27], [28] to improve the key rate. Various useful structural
descriptions of QKD, revolving more around P/M-QKD,
have also been proposed before [5], [29], [6].
After the initial presentation of this result [30], and dur-
ing the preparation of the current manuscript, Renes and
Smith [31] reported the following related result. The P/M-
QKD scheme [26], [32] that uses local noise inflicted by
Alice to increase the key rate has an interpretation as a
QKD scheme based on distributing and distilling a partic-
ular private/twisted state. Thus they arrived at an (ex-
isting) example of P/M-QKD based on private states (but
the state has to be (ebit) distillable since the noise is lo-
cal). This is complementary to our current result (item (2))
that aims at a general recipe to convert distillation-based
schemes to P/M-QKD.
Finally, [33] contains a summary of this paper without the
technical details.
II. Details of our result
Recall that in the current formulation of QKD, the goal is
to accurately test whether the shared bipartite state ?ρ is
in some set Se or not, and if so, apply a transformation
that will bring any state in that Se to a state close to
a private state γ. The test and transformation use only
LOCC. Note that ?ρ is determined by eavesdropping and
the channel properties, while Se and the test is part of the
design of the QKD scheme. We will describe and prove the
security of a QKD scheme with Se containing ⊗-twisted-ǫ-
good-pbits (see Def. 2).
As described before, our procedure also applies to any Se
containing states which can be converted into ⊗-twisted-ǫ-
good-pbits by LOCC, by prepending such transformation
to our scheme. As an example, Se may contain tensor
power of key distillable states σ⊗n for arbitrarily large n.
Since σ is key distillable, ∃k such that σ⊗k can be prepro-
cessed by Lk (via LOCC) to a state σ˜k that approximates
some private state to some predetermined accuracy (the
dimension of the key part is then 2kr for some r > 0). To
test if ?ρ ∈ Se (i.e., whether ?ρ = σ⊗n), Alice and Bob can
first apply the preprocessing L⊗⌊n/k⌋k to ?ρ, followed by our
estimation procedure for S˜e containing σ˜
⊗⌊n/k⌋
k , which is
a ⊗-twisted-ǫ-good-pbit. Clearly if ?ρ ∈ Se, the above test
will pass with high probability. There are several subtle
points concerning this reduction: (1) The key-rate can be
suboptimal. (2) The preprocessing may prevent the QKD
scheme from being easily converted to P/M-QKD schemes.
(3) The dimension of the new key part, 2kr, is finite but can
be large for finite preprocessing precision, and the accuracy
of our test has a strong dimensional dependence.
We will also return to one other observation in Sec. VI, that
for a given state, it can be related to many different pbits
(defined by different twisting operations). Consequently,
the error rate of a state relative to each pbit and thus the
key rate depend on the choice of the pbit being considered,
and should be optimized. For now, we consider an arbi-
trary choice, such as one arising from the knowledge of the
available channel. Later, we will describe a simple method
for the optimization in Sec. VI.
Both [21] and this paper exploit the relation between ǫ-
good-ebits and ǫ-good-pbits – they differ only by a change
of basis (in particular, for ⊗-twisted-ǫ-good-pbits, the
change is simply given by the tensor power of the single-
system twisting operation Eq. (2)). That the twisting is
not an LOCC operation, of course, changes all the nonlo-
cal resource accounting. But surprisingly, as we will see, a
variation of the Lo-Chau scheme is invariant under twist-
ing, except for one step. So, we detail how and why the
Lo-Chau scheme works, and explain how that exceptional
step can be circumvened.
A. Concepts in tolerable attacks
Core to the analysis of QKD using noisy resources is a
notion of tolerable adversarial attacks, which are quantified
by the parameters to be estimated. (For example, these are
chosen to be the number of bit-flip and phase-flip errors in
the transmitted qubits in many schemes.) We make this
notion precise in the following, and develop notations used
throughout the paper. Consider an n-qubit system. Let e
be the Pauli group acting on it (parameter n omitted). For
each P ∈ e, up to a scalar factor in {±1,±i}, P = σx1x σz1z ⊗
σx2x σ
z2
z ⊗ · · ·σxnx σznz where σx,z are the generators for the
qubit Pauli group, and xi, zi ∈ {0, 1} are matrix exponents.
It will become clear that the scalar factor is irrelevant in our
work, thus each P is represented by the two n-bit strings
x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) and z = (z1, z2, · · · , zn), which we
will call the “X- and Z-components” of P . The number
of 1’s in a bitstring is called its Hamming weight. Let
ǫ = (ǫx, ǫz). They will represent two error rates critical in
the security of QKD. Collect all P ’s in e that have X and
Z-components with Hamming weights no greater than nǫx
and nǫz into a set eǫ, and denote the linear span of eǫ (over
C) by seǫ. The eavesdropping attack of current interest,
described as a trace-preserving completely-positive (TCP)
map, is of the form
Pǫ(ρ) =
∑
k
Ek ρE
†
k (3)
where Ek ∈ seǫ for all k and where the usual trace-
preserving condition
∑
k E
†
kEk = I holds. Note that
ǫx, ǫz ≤ 1, and when equality holds, seǫ is the set of all
bounded operators, thus, any eavesdropping attack is of
the form Eq. (3) for sufficiently large ǫx, ǫz.
For the case of qubit transmission, we omit the d = 2 in
the notation for the maximally entangled state |Φd〉 and
Φd. Using Eq. (3), we make the important definition:
Definition 1 (ǫ-good-ebit) We call the state Pǫ(Φ⊗n) “n ǫ-
good-ebits”, where Pǫ acts on the n qubits of Bob and the
identity map acts on the n qubits of Alice.
Note that ǫ-good-ebits are not
6states. We now define the analogue in a twisted basis:
Definition 2 (⊗-twisted-ǫ-good-pbit) We call the state
U⊗n[Pǫ(Φ⊗n) ⊗ ρanc]U †⊗n “n ⊗-twisted-ǫ-good-pbits”,
where U is a twisting operator given by Eq. (2), and the
ancillary state ρanc can be arbitrary over all the ancillary
systems (A′B′)⊗n.
B. The Lo-Chau scheme
The Lo-Chau scheme focuses on the d = 2 case. Alice uses
the channel n times to send Bob’s halves of n ebits she
prepared locally. In the absence of Eve, ?ρ shared after step
(1) should differ from Φ⊗n by the channel noise. It thus
makes sense to use ǫ = (ǫx, ǫz) as the parameter e in Se,
and define Sǫ to be the set of all n ǫ-good-ebits. Here,
ǫx, ǫz are called the bit and phase error rates respectively.
When eavesdropping is possible, Alice and Bob need to
determine ǫ for which ?ρ ∈ Sǫ with high probability. In
security proofs, we do not lose security if we assume less.
So, we let ?ρ be completely unconstrained and allow Eve to
possess the purification of ?ρ. (A purification of a mixed
state ρ on a system s1 is a pure state on two systems s1,s2
such that tracing out the extra system s2 will give ρ. The
purifying system s2 contains all information related to s1
outside of it.) Since {P |Φ〉⊗nAB}P∈e is a basis for H(AB)⊗n ,
the purification of ?ρ, |Ψ1〉, has the form
|Ψ1〉 =
∑
P∈e
αP (P |Φ〉⊗nAB)⊗ |eP 〉E . (4)
Here, P ranges over all possible n-qubit Pauli operators in
e and acts on Bob’s n qubits, αP are arbitrary amplitudes,
and |eP 〉E are normalized states on system E.
Step (2) in the Lo-Chau scheme is carried out by estimat-
ing the error rates ǫx, ǫz by random sampling of the AB-
systems without replacement. To estimate ǫx, m systems
are chosen randomly and σz ⊗ σz is measured on each of
them, and the estimated ǫx is the number of −1 outcomes
divided bym. (Note that the outcome of measuring σz⊗σz
on an ebit should be +(−)1 when there is zero(one) σx er-
ror). In other words, one measures λ, the eigenvalue of∑m
i=1(σz ⊗ σz)(i)AB where (i) denotes the ith sampled sys-
tem, and estimate ǫx to be
1
2 (1 − λm ). (Similarly for ǫz.)
We will next describe the estimation process in two ways,
a simple abstraction and the actual implementation, and
we show that they are equivalent.
In the abstract, the error estimation transforms the state
to ∑
P
αP (P |Φ〉⊗nAB)
∑
ǫ
µP,ǫ|ǫ〉O ⊗ |eP 〉E (5)
where the experimental estimate of the error rates of the
QKD execution, |ǫ〉 = |ǫx, ǫz〉, is in the system O avail-
able to all three parties. In a good estimation procedure,
the estimated error rates should not deviate significantly
from the actual values, except with very small probabil-
ity. Let nǫxP , nǫzP be the Hamming weights of the X-
and Z-components of P . A good estimation translates to
the mathematical statement that, for each ǫxP , ǫzP , the
sum of |µP,ǫ|2 over ǫ should be small whenever |ǫxP − ǫx|
or |ǫzP − ǫz| is significant. Reference [5] provides a test
procedure for the Lo-Chau scheme based on random sam-
pling that achieves the following: For small δ and for
m < ( 2δ
2
1+2δ2 )n, we have
Pr( |ǫxP−ǫx| ≥ δ) ≤ f(m, δ) (6)
where f(m, δ) := 2 exp
(−2mδ2) with natural exp rather
than base 2, so that |µP,ǫx,ǫz |2 ≤ 2f(m, δ) if max(|ǫx −
ǫxP |, |ǫz − ǫzP |) ≥ δ. In Eq. (6), the probability is over
the random sample taken for the error estimate. (See [34]
for a derivation of Eq. (6) from [5].) To achieve good es-
timation is a central aspect of QKD. The proof in [5] is
subtle – measurement of P commutes with measurement
of ǫ so that whether the former is done cannot change the
distribution of the latter. So, we can assume measurement
of P has been done here. Most importantly, such assump-
tion applies even to actual indirect measurements of ǫ that
may not commute with measurement of P , as long as the
indirect measurement gives accurate results, and all inter-
mediate results (except for the final outcome) are discarded
(see argument to follow). This imagined measurement of P
turns both P and ǫ into classical random variables so that
classical random sampling theory can be applied.
In real experiments, there are two differences from the
abstraction. First, the intended measurement operators
σx ⊗ σx and σz ⊗ σz are nonlocal (these are parity mea-
surements in the conjugate and computational bases) but
they are implemented via local measurements, for example,
the eigenvalue of σx ⊗ σx is obtained by measuring that of
σx ⊗ I and I ⊗ σx on the properly paired AB systems and
classically taking the product of the two outcomes (±1).
Second, the 2m random samples will be irreversibly mea-
sured out. We want to replace the analysis of the real ex-
periments by that of the abstraction, and we now show that
such replacement is valid if we impose certain conditions
on the protocol, as detailed in the following observation:
Observation 2: If Alice and Bob perform (1) local (demo-
lition) measurements, (2) classical communication of the
outcomes, (3) classical postprocessing and output a func-
tion of the outcomes, (4) discard all measured systems, all
intermediate outcomes and communicated messages, then
the procedure is equivalent to a direct measurement yield-
ing the function (and nothing else) and discarding the mea-
sured system.
Proof: Local measurements can be made “coherently” so
that the outcome is stored in the computational basis
of an ancilla without being read. Classical communica-
tion from Alice to Bob can be modeled as the isometry
|x〉A → |x〉A|x〉B |x〉E where Eve’s copy ensures classicality
and generality of the security argument. Similarly for clas-
sical communication from Bob to Alice. Then, Alice and
Bob each performs the classical postprocessing (locally) to
derive the same intended measurement outcome. Besides
this, they discard everything else, i.e. they give to Eve
7all measured systems, their copies of the coherent classical
communication, and the workspace of the classical-post-
processing, and Eve can reconstruct the postmeasurement
state. The entire procedure is thus equivalent to the desired
direct measurement.
Keep in mind not to use the 2m samples again, we can
analyze the state in Eq. (5) in the abstract setting. This
state can be rewritten as
∑
P
′∑
ǫ
αP µP,ǫ (P |Φ〉⊗nAB) |ǫ〉O ⊗ |eP 〉E + |Ψbad〉 (7)
where the primed sum of ǫ is now restricted to those terms
in which ǫx, ǫz are δ close to ǫxP , ǫzP respectively, and the
unnormalized |Ψbad〉 contains all other terms with bad es-
timates. The important point is that |Ψbad〉 has norm
squared bounded by 2f(m, δ). (To see this, label the sum
over those ǫ by a double prime, and
∑
P
∑′′
ǫ |αPµP,ǫ|2 =∑
P |αP |2
∑′′
ǫ |µP,ǫ|2 ≤
∑
P |αP |22f(m, δ) ≤ 2f(m, δ)).
We include this bad term in our equations to keep track
of the entire picture but we need not worry about its evo-
lution.
In step (3), based on the estimates ǫx, ǫz, Alice and Bob run
any applicable EPP (e.g. see [16], [22]) on the unmeasured
n− 2m systems. In the abstract, the state becomes
∑
P
′∑
ǫ
αP µP,ǫ
(
βg |Φ〉⊗(n−2m)rǫAB |gǫ〉+ βb |bǫ〉
) |ǫ〉O|eP 〉E
+|Ψbad〉
To obtain the above expression, note that the output of
EPP depends on P , ǫ, and random inputs of EPP. Taking
a coherent description for the local coins, and focusing on
one (P, ǫ)-term in the primed sum where error estimate is
accurate, EPP produces an output with high fidelity with
respect to |Φ〉⊗(n−2m)rǫAB where rǫ is the entanglement rate
depending mostly on ǫ (and slightly on n−2m for finite ef-
fect, and finally, negligibly on the local coins because this
effect can be removed by lowering the rate slightly). We
collect the rest of the system into a sufficiently large auxil-
iary space. Uhlmann’s theorem [35] guarantees an output
state for the (P ,ǫ)-term in the form inside the parenthesis:
the auxiliary output states |Φ〉⊗(n−2m)rǫAB |gǫ〉 and the bad
EPP term |bǫ〉 are orthonormal, with βg,b > 0, β2g+β2b = 1
and βb upper bounded by a function exponentially decay-
ing with n [16], [3], [22], [36]. If ǫx, ǫz are too high, rǫ = 0
and implicitly QKD is aborted (yet preserving security).
The incoherence between the different P, ǫ terms can be
absorbed into the auxiliary system. In real experiments,
EPP is done incoherently, but as long as Alice and Bob re-
frain from using anything other than the final output (i.e.
discarding everything else) the abstract picture will hold.
Finally, Alice and Bob measure out a key from the
(AB)⊗(n−2m)rǫ systems, which has high fidelity to ebits
(when conditioning on other systems is NOT made). This
guarantees security [8] in the universal composable def-
inition [9], [8]. In particular, let the ideal state be
|ψideal〉 =
∑
P,ǫ αP µP,ǫ |Φ〉⊗nAB |gǫ〉|ǫ〉O ⊗ |eP 〉E , and the
output in the last equation be |ψactual〉. Then, the
QKD (in)security parameter in [8] is upper bounded
by
√
1− |〈ψideal|ψactual〉|2 ≤
√
4f(δ,m) + β2b (because
|〈ψideal|ψactual〉| ≥ (1 − 2f(δ,m))βg). Roughly speaking,
it means that if an ideal key used in any application is
replaced by the one generated in the QKD protocol, no
attack involving all parts of the application can achieve a
statistical difference better than the stated insecurity pa-
rameter.
Note that if better EPP protocols are found and used
in QKD (more rapidly vanishing βb) the above analy-
sis implies corresponding improvement in the key rate
and security of the resulting QKD. As a concrete exam-
ple, [22] presents a scheme that achieves a key rate of
1 − H(ǫx) − H(ǫz) where H is the binary entropy func-
tion and ǫx, ǫz are the observed error rates, and is nonzero
for ǫx < 1/2 if ǫz ≈ 0 (and vice versa) or ǫx = ǫz < 0.11. It
follows from subsection I-C that underlying states or chan-
nels with less error has the potential to establish a secure
key.
We end this section with a definition for a useful concept
we came across:
Definition 3 (Product vs nonproduct observables) A prod-
uct observable (with respect to systems S1, S2) is one of
the form OS1 ⊗ OS2. While nonlocal, it can be measured
using LOCC: perform the individual local measurements
OS1⊗IS2, IS1⊗OS2, exchange the classical outcomes, and
calculate the product.
C. Replacing EPP by EC/PA
In [3], [22], classes of entanglement purification protocols
(EPP) were found to have a very nice property when used
in EPP-QKD. If Alice and Bob apply EPP followed by fi-
nal measurements in the computational basis to extract a
key, their many steps can be rearranged without chang-
ing the security of the final key. In particular, the rear-
ranged protocol has the computational basis measurement
done first, generating what is called a “sifted-raw-key” (the
adjective “sifted” is only useful later in the mapping to
P/M-QKD). The steps of the original EPP become (classi-
cal) error correction (EC) on the sifted-raw-key followed by
privacy amplification (PA) to generate the final key. Such
EPP include 1-EPP protocols corresponding to CSS codes
(i.e. involving only parity checks entirely in the computa-
tional basis, or entirely in the conjugate basis), and also
2-EPP protocols that are CSS like, symmetric with respect
to exchanging Alice and Bob, and with each step depending
only on prior measurement outcomes in the computational
basis. We will call such schemes EC/PA-Lo-Chau schemes,
which, from now on, are always being considered in place
of the original Lo-Chau scheme.
References [3], [22], [5] provide recipes to convert EPP-
QKD to the simpler P/M-QKD. We will first describe a
pbit-distillation based QKD scheme (PPP-QKD) and pro-
vide a security proof in the next section. In Sec. III, we out-
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D. QKD based on ⊗-twisted-ǫ-good-pbits
We first consider the d = 2 case in direct correspondence
with the EC/PA-Lo-Chau scheme, again omitting the d =
2 notations in γUd and |Φd〉.
After step (1), Alice and Bob are sharing untrusted state
?ρ, and in step (2) Alice and Bob want to test if ∃Sǫ such
that ?ρ ∈ Sǫ, where
Sǫ = {U⊗n
(Pǫ(Φ⊗nAB)⊗ ρanc )U †⊗n} (8)
is a set of ⊗-twisted-ǫ-good-pbits (see Def. 2) for some U
satisfying Eq. (2) and some arbitrary ancillary state ρanc
on (A′B′)⊗n. In principle, Alice and Bob only need to find
ǫ, but not U and ρanc as long as they exist. We will see that
the protocol is independent of ρanc. For now, we assume
they make a certain guess for U and we will come back to
remove this requirement in Section VI.
Consider the following unfeasible scheme: first untwist, i.e.,
apply U⊗n† to ?ρ, then apply the EC/PA-Lo-Chau scheme.
This is equivalent to running the EC/PA-Lo-Chau scheme
in the case of Sǫ = {Pǫ(Φ⊗nAB)} and thus it is secure. The
problem is that untwisting is global and requires resources
unavailable in real-life QKD. Our strategy is to write down
(mathematically) this secure but unfeasible scheme as a
first step. Then, we explain security-preserving modifica-
tions that make the scheme feasible using the usual re-
sources allowed in QKD. In short, this is possible because
only one step in EC/PA-Lo-Chau scheme is affected by the
twisting and untwisting operations (see also [21]). The ex-
ceptional step is the estimation of ǫz in the twisted basis.
In [21], it was handled by first distilling some ebits followed
by teleportation of a small number of test system to enable
untwisting. Here, it will be handled without distilling ebits.
In detail, this secure but unfeasible protocol runs as follows:
(2) Apply untwisting U⊗n† to ?ρ, then estimate ǫx and ǫz on
the (AB)⊗n systems (by using mx and mz random samples
respectively), and finally reapply U⊗n.
(3’) Apply untwisting U⊗n†, measure out a sifted-raw-key
in the n−mx−mz systems.
(4’) Perform error correction and privacy amplification on
the sifted-raw-key via 1- or 2-way public discussion.
We now explain how to transform the above protocol to
one involving only measurements of product observables
and classical communication, and in particular, without the
distillation of ebits. In step (2), only a random subset of
mx+mz systems are measured. On the other n−mx−mz
untested systems, the untwisting and twisting cancel out
(thus can be omitted). On the tested systems, for the es-
timate of ǫz, untwisting, measuring
1
mz
∑mz
i=1(σx ⊗ σx)(i)AB
and twisting (where i is a label of the tested sample) is
equivalent to the measurement of Γidealx av :=
1
mz
∑mz
i=1 Γ
(i)
x
where Γx = UABA′B′(σx ⊗ σx ⊗ IA′B′)U †ABA′B′ . Here, Γx
is a nonproduct observable (see Def. 3) and generally, it
cannot be measured in a one-shot manner using LOCC.
However, our goal is to estimate ǫz by measuring the com-
bined Γidealx av , which is an average of Γx over many different
systems, and for this purpose, we can apply some other
LOCC measurement, the method and the accuracy will be
given in the next paragraph. For the estimate of ǫx, the
twisted observable Γz = UABA′B′(σz ⊗ σz ⊗ I)U †ABA′B′ is
simply σz ⊗ σz ⊗ IA′B′ because σz commutes with U and
U †. So, the original analysis of [4] holds, and mx samples
are used for this estimate. In step (3’) and (4’), the com-
putational basis measurement to obtain the sifted-raw-key
and the rest of the classical postprocessing all commute
with U⊗n†. Thus, we can finish the entire QKD protocol
before the untwisting, which then clearly does nothing and
can be omitted.
LOCC estimation of ǫz via product observables:
The goal is to replace a measurement of Γidealx av :=
1
mz
∑mz
i=1 Γ
(i)
x by an LOCCmeasurement of product observ-
ables, such that the outcomes have similar average values.
We denote the probability distribution of the outcome of
measuring Γidealx av by µideal, and that of the LOCC measure-
ment of product observables by µlocc, and their averages
by µ¯ideal and µ¯locc. If the state being measured is fixed,
µideal and µ¯ideal are fixed, but µlocc and µ¯locc are random
variables depending on the measurement outcomes.
We now explain the LOCC measurement that generates
µlocc. First, obtain a decomposition for the single system
observable Γx into product observables:
Γx = UABA′B′(σx ⊗ σx ⊗ I)U †ABA′B′ (9)
=
t∑
ja,jb=1
sjajbOjaAA′ ⊗OjbBB′ (10)
where {Oj}tj=1 is a basis (trace-orthonormal) for hermitian
operators acting on AA′ and BB′, and t = d2d′. Second,
Alice and Bob divide theirmz samples into t
2 groups. They
use each group for one pair of (ja, jb), and they obtain
a measurement outcome denoted by Outmz/t2 [OjaAA′ ⊗
OjbBB′ ] of the observable
t2
mz
∑mz/t2
i=1 (OjaAA′ ⊗OjbBB′)(i).
This is related to a sum of product observables, and can
be measured in LOCC as mentioned before (Alice and Bob
can individually measure OjaAA′ and OjbBB′ on the ith
test system, multiply their results via LOCC, and finally
sum those products over i = 1, · · · ,mz/t2) and take av-
erage. Also, let
∑
ja,jb
sjajbOutmz/t2 [OjaAA′ ⊗ OjbBB′ ] be
the “outcome” of the LOCC estimation of the phase error
rate, defining a distribution µlocc.
Is µ¯locc close to µ¯ideal that is generated by measuring Γ
ideal
x av
directly? It will be if the entire mz sample systems are in
a joint tensor-power state, and if mz/t
2 is large enough
(because Chernoff-like bounds will hold and because of
Eq. (10)). However, in our current problem, Alice and Bob
share ?ρ which is not a tensor-power state. Fortunately,
first, by means of random sampling, we can assume per-
mutation symmetry in this analysis, and second, since the
estimation involves only a small portion (mz) of the entire
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states that the measured (reduced) state is close to a mix-
ture of “almost-tensor-power-states” so that the Chernoff-
like bounds will hold and the estimate will thus be accurate.
The exact analysis involves many adaptations of the results
in [6]. In the appendix, we prove a more general theorem
(Theorem 3) for any observable O on one copy of the bipar-
tite Hilbert space in place of Γx, for any dimensions, and
for µideal generated by measuring
1
m
∑m
i=1O
(i) and µlocc
generated by the above LOCC procedure. We obtain an
upper bound for Pr(|µ¯ideal − µ¯locc| > δ) as follows.
Adapting Theorem 3, we write the symbol in the appendix
on the left hand side of the arrow, and what it should be
in the current context on the right hand side. We choose
the parameters as d → d2d′, t → t2 = d4d′2, n+ 2m → n,
m → mz, δ → δ/3, ‖Γx‖2HS = d2d′ (since Γx is unitary).
Then,
Pr( |µ¯ideal − µ¯locc| > δ)
≤ 2e−
(n−mz)(r+1)
2n +
1
2d
4d′2 ln(n−mz)
+ (t2 + 1)2
−
»
δ2
36t2d2d′−H(
rt2
mz
)
–
mz
t2 +d
′d2 log(
mz
2t2 +1)
+ 2e−
mzδ
2
144d′d2 (11)
where the three expressions in the upper bound respec-
tively come from the exponential quantum de Finetti theo-
rem, the Chernoff bound, and random sampling theory. (In
the last term of the above, we have used a tighter bound
given directly by Proposition 1 instead of the general bound
in Theorem 3.) Also, throughout the paper, H(·) denotes
the binary entropy function.
Furthermore, by the sampling theory Proposition 1 in the
Appendix, ǫx can also be estimated with mx samples to
the accuracy Pr(| ǫx,P − ǫx| > δ) ≤ 2e−
mxδ
2
16 .
Putting these altogether, Pr(| ǫz,P−ǫz| ≥ δ or | ǫx,P−ǫx| ≥
δ) ≤ f(mx,mz, δ) for
f(mx,mz, δ)
≤ 2e−mxδ2/16
+ 2e−
(n−mz)(r+1)
2n +
1
2d
4d′2 ln(n−mz)
+ (t2 + 1)2
−
»
δ2
36t2d2d′−H(
rt2
mz
)
–
mz
t2 +d
′d2 log(
mz
2t2 +1)
+ 2e−
mzδ
2
144d′d2 (12)
The composable security parameter will still be less than√
4f(δ,mx,mz) + β2b as derived in the summary of the
original Lo-Chau scheme.
Now, we state parameters that will make
q
4f(δ,mx,mz) + β2b
exponentially small in some security parameter s. Note
that βb is unaffected by our modification to the EC/PA-
Lo-Chau scheme, and we focus on the f(δ,mx,mz) portion.
We choose some security parameter s and make each term
in Eq. (12) exponentially small in s (≈ 2−s) by the follow-
ing choices (with each item corresponding to each term in
order).
(1) Take sample size for bit-error rate to be mx = s× 16δ2 .
(2) Generally, since mz has to be small compared to n,
thus, r = 4s and r ≥ d4d′2 lnn.
(3) m′ := mz/t2 should be large (at least O(s)), while
r/m′ ≪ 1 and m′ ≫ logm′. In particular, say, H(r/m′) ≤
δ2/(72t2d2d′) and m′δ2/(72t2d2d′) ≥ 2d′d2 log(m′/2 + 1)
and m′ ≥ s× 144t2d2d′/δ2 − 2 log t.
(4) m′ ≥ s+1t2 144d
′d2
δ2 .
Clearly, for s ranging from constant to linear in n, there are
corresponding choices of r,mz,mx that will work. Roughly
speaking,mx ≥ O(s/δ2) andmz ≥ O(log n) will be the two
asymptotic requirements when d, d′ are fixed. The final key
rate can be given by (1− (mx+mz)/n)×Rǫx,ǫz where the
first factor is due to the use of private states and the re-
sulting more complicated error estimation procedure (but
lower bounded by the above choices ofmx andmz) and the
second factor depends on the observed twisted error rates
(that can be much lower than that relative to ebits and
where our protocol provides an advantage) and the choice
of EPP (or EC/PA procedure) lower bounds of which are
extensively studied in QKD based on ebits.
With this analysis of the accuracy of the estimation, and
following from earlier discussion, the security proof for the
QKD protocol is completed.
III. Prepare and measure scheme
In the previous section, we have provided a security proof
of the pbit-purification-based QKD (PPP-QKD) protocols
in which the parties are processing an untrusted shared
state and are extracting a key from it. Typically, the pro-
cessing requires quantum memory, and some times, coher-
ent operations on the quantum state. As we have noted,
entanglement-distillation-based protocol (EPP-QKD) are
closely related to the much simpler P/M-QKD. We will
thus convert our PPP-QKD protocol to a P/M-QKD
scheme, adapting to pbits earlier works based on ebits [3],
[5], [22].
In PPP-QKD, the initial state is completely arbitrary. In
P/M-QKD, Alice first prepares the state, and then Eve
attacks it. Thus, the state ?ρ is more restricted. In partic-
ular, we focus on tensor power states prepared by Alice –
the most physically relevant case because of the simplicity
in implementation.
Since our protocol already has the distillation steps re-
placed by EC/PA, there are only 2 coherent steps to mod-
ify: (1) distribute ?ρ via an untrusted channel and (2) esti-
mate ǫx, ǫz on the sample systems and measure the rest in
the computational basis to generate the sifted-raw-key.
We now dissect these two steps. In most of the useful cases,
in step (1), Alice only needs to prepare a tensor power state
ρ⊗n0 over the n bipartite systems and send each of Bob’s
halves via one use of the given untrusted channel N . They
are expecting to share the state (I ⊗N (ρ0))⊗n while they
are actually sharing ?ρ = (I⊗n ⊗ E(ρ⊗n0 )) for an arbitrary
joint attack E by Eve. For step (2), recall that it suffices
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to perform measurements of product observables on indi-
vidual system. Now, focus on such a measurement of some
Oa ⊗ Ob on one of these systems. Let {|ψl〉}l be a com-
plete set of eigenvectors of Oa. Note that Alice’s measure-
ment on each of her halves of the state commutes with the
transmission via the channel and Bob’s measurement. So,
she can measure first, before sending each of Bob’s halves,
without affecting the security. It means that she sends the
state trAA′ [(|ψl〉〈ψl|AA′ ⊗ IBB′) ρ0AA′BB′ ] (unnormalized)
with probability which is the trace of that state, followed
by a measurement of Ob by Bob. Thus, a conversion to
P/M-QKD can be obtained, with a caveat.
The problem is that in purification-based QKD, each pair
of local measurements for each system is chosen proba-
bilistically (from Eve’s point of view) and with perfect co-
ordination between Alice and Bob. When converting to
P/M-QKD, various naive options fail or come with ex-
tra requirements: (a) If Alice announces her measurement
before Bob signals receipt of the states, Eve could have
intercepted the transmitted state, performed Bob’s mea-
surement, resent the postmeasurement state to Bob, and
completely evaded detection. (b) If Alice waits until Bob
signals receipt of the states, before announcing her basis,
and then Bob makes his measurements, he will need quan-
tum memory to hold his received states. (c) If Alice’s bases
annnouncement is encrypted with a private key, it has to be
of length roughly O(mz logn) = O(s polylog(n)/δ
2) where
s is the security parameter of the QKD protocol (which
can range from constant to linear in n). In comparison, an
initial key is also required for the authentication of some of
the classical messages. It is an open problem what is the
minimum authentication requirement. If one authenticates
all of the bases information, the identity of the states in the
test samples for parameter estimation, and forward com-
munication in EC/PA, it will take O(log n) key bits. Thus,
for high security parameter requiring mz to be growing
with n, encryption of the bases information qualitatively
increases the the amount of the initial key required.
The initial solution in BB84 was to have Bob guessing
the measurement basis, and postselect those with properly
matched measurement basis. The price is a lower key rate.
The method was improved on by [5] so as to preserve the
key rate asymptotically. We will adapt this technique in
our protocol.
The idea in [5] is that, even though randomness in the
measurement basis is necessary for security, only a small
fraction needs to differ from the computational basis to
have sufficient confidence in the estimates of ǫx, ǫz – some-
thing we have already exploited in the PPP-QKD scheme
in the previous section. Here, Alice and Bob will inde-
pendently pick a large enough fraction O(nc) of the n sys-
tems to be measured for each Oj (the orthonormal basis
for operators acting on each of the local systems AA′ and
BB′). These samples are chosen randomly and with high
probability over the choice, for each pair (ja, jb), the ob-
servable Oja ⊗ Ojb would have been applied to a fraction
O(n2c−2) of all systems, giving O(n2c−1) random samples.
Remember the requirement mz ≥ s polylog(n)/δ2, so that
nc ≥ √snpolylog(n)/δ will provide sufficient overlap for
calculcating 〈OjaAA′ ⊗ OjbBB′〉 and subsequently ǫz. For
the protocol in the previous section, the local dimensions
are d
√
d′ and each of Alice and Bob have t = d2d′−1 trace-
less observables to measure locally. Thus O(tnc) ≈ o(n)
systems will be used for estimating ǫz and the rest can all
be measured in the computational basis (for estimating ǫx
and for the (unsifted) raw-key generation) thus the key rate
of the original PPP-QKD scheme is preserved. Finally, by
the procedure to turn a measurement of Alice and ρ0 into
an ensemble of signal states, the conversion to a P/M-QKD
is completed.
We note that the above procedure can be suboptimal, es-
pecially if t is large. For example, if the decomposition
of the single system observable Γx has low Schmidt rank
t′ ≪ t2 in the Hilbert-Schmidt decomposition, then, effec-
tively, only t′ local observables have to be measured. Also,
data from unmatching bases can be potentially useful but
in the current scheme they are discarded for simplicity of
the analysis. These, and other optimization, are issues for
future research.
IV. A channel with zero quantum capacity and
nonzero key rate
Recall that there are key distillable but bound entangled
states [1], [17], [37]. Using results in the current paper,
they can be verified and therefore can have nonzero rates
of generating unconditionally secure key. The adversarial
setting is totally unconditional, as described in Subsection
I-C. Based on one of these states, we construct a channel
that has zero quantum capacity and nonzero key rate.
The channel is defined as follows. According to Section
III, Alice prepares a tensor power state ρ⊗n0 over n bi-
partite systems and sends each of Bob’s halves via one
use of the given untrusted channel N . They are expect-
ing to share the state (I ⊗ N (ρ0))⊗n while they are ac-
tually sharing ?ρ = (I⊗n ⊗ E(ρ⊗n0 )) for an arbitrary joint
attack E by Eve. We choose I ⊗ N (ρ0) to be ρH from
[37] (the definition will be given later). This state has 3
desirable properties. (1) ρH has a maximally mixed re-
duced state on AA′. Thus it can indeed be written as
ρH = (IAA′ ⊗ NBB′)(ΦdAB ⊗ Φd′A′B′) for some channel
NBB′ . (2) ρH is PPT (having positive partial transpose
[19]) and is thus bound entangled. Since ρH is bound en-
tangled if and only if N is entanglement binding (with zero
rate to create entanglement for any unentangled input)
([38]), N has zero quantum capacity. (3) On the other
hand, if verified, ρH has nonzero key rate. Correspond-
ingly, in the absence of eavesdropping, Alice and Bob can
use N to distribute copies of ρH , verify them, and generate
a key. Thus ρH and N provide the example we are seeking.
We now define the state ρH . Recall that for a pure state
|ψ〉, we use the shorthand ψ for the density matrix |ψ〉〈ψ|.
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Define the four Bell states as
|ψ0,1〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉) (13)
|ψ2,3〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |01〉) (14)
with the projectors given by ψi. Define also the states
|χ±〉 = 1
2
(
√
2±
√
2 |00〉 ±
√
2∓
√
2 |11〉) (15)
Then, for κ a small parameter to be defined later, take
ρH = (1− κ)
∑
i
qiψiAB ⊗ ρ(i)A′B′ + κ I16 (16)
where q0 = q1 =
p
2 , q2 = q3 =
1−p
2 , and
ρ(0) =
1
2
[|00〉〈00|+ ψ2]
ρ(1) =
1
2
[|11〉〈11|+ ψ3]
ρ(2,3) = χ+,− (17)
For p =
√
2
1+
√
2
, and κ = 0, ρH = ρ
T2
H where T2 denotes
the partial transpose of the second system. In particular,
ρH is PPT. When p 6=
√
2
1+
√
2
, the 1−κ term need not be
PPT anymore, but choosing a small nonzero κ will give a
corresponding neighborhood of p for which ρH will remain
PPT and thus bound entangled. Here, we claim that there
is an untwisting operation of the form given by Eq. (2)
that we can apply to ρH , so that further tracing of A
′B′
will give us the state
σAB = (1− κ)
(
pψ0 + (1− p)ψ2
)
+ κ I4 . (18)
Note that the transformation of the κ term is straightfor-
ward and also κ→ 0, so, we can focus on the (1−κ) term.
Let V1 be any unitary that transforms the following states
as:
|00〉 → |00〉 , |11〉 → |11〉 , |ψ2〉 → |01〉 , |ψ3〉 → |10〉 (19)
and V2 transforms |χ+,−〉 to |00〉, |11〉 respectively. V1,2
exist, because they preserve orthonormality of the input
space. Then, the untwisting operation can be defined as:
UH =
(|11〉〈11|AB ⊗ σzA′ ⊗ IB′)×(
(|00〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11|)AB ⊗ V1A′B′
+(|01〉〈01|+ |10〉〈10|)AB ⊗ V2A′B′
)
(20)
This is because the right hand factor first transforms
the ρ
(0,1,2,3)
A′B′ component in ρH to
1
2 (|00〉〈00| + |01〉〈01|),
1
2 (|11〉〈11| + |10〉〈10|), |00〉〈00|, and |11〉〈11|, respec-
tively, and the subsequent left hand factor (effectively a
controlled-σz from A
′ to A) turns ψ1,3 into ψ0,2 respec-
tively. This proves the assertion that the untwisted state
is given by Eq. (18). The exact key rate in an execution
will depend on the observed error rates ǫx, ǫz, but it can
potentially be close to being given by Eq. (18). In this case,
for very small κ and p > 1/2 (we have taken p ≈ 0.5858),
certain EPP (1-way asymmetric CSS EPP) studied in [16],
[22] can distill a key from ?ρ at a rate 1−H(ǫx)−H(ǫz) which
is ≈ 1 −H(0.5858) ≈ 0.0213 according to Eq. (18). Thus
there exists a corresponding EC/PA procedure to generate
a key from our protocol. This completes the proof that an
untrusted channel, supposedly N , is entanglement binding
but can have nonzero key rate.
As a side remark, the first term of ρH represents as mix-
ture of two pbits with a common twisting operation (no
constraint on ancillary state) but differing by a bit-flip of
the underlying ebit. EPP on these mixtures are particu-
larly simple.
Let us also understand this channel N in more operational
terms. Recall that a channel is completely determined by
the state I ⊗N (Φd) where d is the input dimension of N .
Thus, any correct way to transform ΦAB ⊗ ΦA′B′ to ρH
via operations on BB′ will be a valid description of how N
acts. Thus consider the following sequence of operations:
(1) With probability p/2, measured B′ in the computa-
tional basis. (a) If outcome is |0〉, do nothing. (b) If out-
come is |1〉, apply σz to B.
(2) With probability p/4, apply σzB ⊗ σyB′ .
(3) With probability p/4, apply σxB′ .
(4) With probability (1−p), measure B′ with the following
POVM
M0 =
[
1
2 (
√
2 +
√
2) 0
0 12 (
√
2−√2)
]
; (21)
M1 =
[
1
2 (
√
2−√2) 0
0 12 (
√
2 +
√
2)
]
. (22)
(a) If the outcome is “0”, apply σxB . (b) If the outcome is
“1”, apply σyB ⊗ σzB′ .
It is immediate that cases (1a), (1b), (2), (3), (4a), and
(4b) give post-measurement states (systems labeled by
ABA′B′): ψ0 ⊗ |00〉〈00|, ψ1 ⊗ |11〉〈11|, ψ1 ⊗ ψ3, ψ0 ⊗ ψ2,
ψ2 ⊗ χ+, and ψ3 ⊗ χ−, respectively. Also, both measure-
ments yield equiprobable outcomes. Thus, the probabilities
for all these cases are p/4, p/4, p/4, p/4, (1−p)/2, (1−p)/2.
Mixing up the states from all the cases gives exactly the
(1−κ) term of ρH . To incorporate the negligible κ term, we
can take convex combination of the above with the com-
pletely randomizing channel on BB′. While the bit and
phase error rates are tricky to define, any simple attempt
will yield amusingly high numbers.
Finally, we can use the recipe in Sec. III to obtain a cor-
responding P/M-QKD scheme. The initial state ρ0 in
this case is ΦAB ⊗ ΦA′B′ . For the estimation of ǫz, Al-
ice will measure product Pauli operators on AA′ because
they form the desired orthonormal basis for traceless ob-
servables. The actual states transmitted are exactly the
equiprobable ensemble of the six eigenstates of σx,y,z on
each of B and B′ for the O(
√
ns) test systems. The rest of
the systems are prepared in random states in the compu-
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tational basis. Likewise, Bob measures O(
√
ns) systems in
the eigenbases of σx,y,z and the rest in computational ba-
sis. Note that the ensemble of states sent and the measure-
ments on Bob’s side are exactly those of the efficient ver-
sion of the six-state protocol. Here, a completely different
interpretation via pbits, and a corrrespondingly different
classical postprocessing scheme yield drastically different
results (the key rate will be zero otherwise).
V. Summary of protocols
We summary our PPP-QKD protocol and the P/M-QKD
protocol in the following. We do not repeat why it is secure
and omit the security parameters that are covered in Secs.
II and III.
We refer to n copies of bipartitite systems AA′ BB′ with
dim(AA′BB′) = D. Alice and Bob preagree on some prod-
uct basis of D2 Hermitian operators Oja ⊗Ojb . Let O1 be
diagonal in the computational basis. Throughout, random
sampling of the systems is done without replacement.
A general PPP-QKD protocol will proceed as follows:
(1) Alice and Bob share untrusted states ?ρ using their un-
derlying quantum resources. The state is supported on n
bipartite systems AA′ BB′, with .
(2) (a) Alice and Bob jointly pick mx systems at random
(by using local coins and 1-way public discussion) and inde-
pendently measure the A and B parts in the computational
basis, and combine the outcomes to obtain the observed er-
ror rate ǫx. (b) For each ja, jb, they jointly pick mz/D
2)
sample systems and measure Oja on AA
′ and Ojb on BB
′
independently. Then, for each candidate untwisting oper-
ation, they combine the outcomes to obtain ǫz. They pick
the lowest value. They measure the rest of the A and B
systems in the computational basis.
(3) Based on ǫz and ǫx, they apply an appriopriate EC/PA
procedure.
(4) They obtain a key of rate determined by ǫz and ǫx.
Step (2b) is the only placing differing from the standard
EC/PA-Lo-Chau schemes.
A general P/M-QKD has the following form:
(1) Alice and Bob share some underlying untrusted channel
N acting on BB′ and can use it n times. They agree on
some ρ0 supported on system AA
′BB′.
(a) For each ja, let |ψl〉AA′ be the eigenvectors of Oja , and
Alice transmits a state trAA′ [(|ψl〉〈ψl|AA′ ⊗ IBB′)ρAA′BB′
(renormalized) via one use of the channel (without know-
ing what happens to the actual transmission) . This state
is labeled by ja and l, and let the normalization be p
ja(l).
The (ja, l) state is transmitted via n
cpja(l) randomly cho-
sen uses of the channel. The rest of the channel uses is the
same but always has ja = 1.
(b) For each jb, Bob measures Ojb on n
c randomly chosen
channel outputs. The rest are measured in O1.
(2) Alice and Bob then start public discussion. They use
systems transmitted based on Oja and measured based on
Ojb to calculate the average of Oja ⊗Ojb (the average of ll′
where Alice transmits state labeled by l and Bob’s outcome
is l′).
(a) They obtain a direct estimate of ǫx.
(b) For each candidate untwisting operation, they obtain
an estimate of ǫz, and they pick the lowest value.
(3) EC/PA is applied.
(4) A key is generated.
VI. Optimal untwisting
In our QKD protocol (both the purification-based and the
P/M variant), the key rate is determined by the estimated
ǫx, ǫz, and once these are measured, we optimize over the
EPP or the EC/PA procedure.
Consider, for each U , the PPP-QKD scheme again.
Given ?ρ, we want to find ǫx, ǫz such that
?ρ ∈ Sǫ =
{U⊗n(Pǫ(ΦAB) ⊗ ρ⊗nA′B′)U †⊗n} and generally, such ǫx, ǫz
will depend on U . As long as ?ρ ∈ Sǫ for some U , ǫ is a
legitimate estimate and EPP will produce a secure key of
appropriate length. (Untwisting only occurs in our inter-
pretation of the sampled data.) To exploit this feature,
note that more precisely, ǫx is independent of twisting, but
ǫz is not. Thus, for a list of possible twisting operators Ui,
Alice and Bob should estimate each of the corresponding
twisted phase error rate ǫzi and take the minimal one to
optimize the key rate extractable in EPP. At a first glance,
they will need to measure Γidealx av for each Ui. But recall that
each twisted phase error is derived from the decomposition
given by Eq. (10) and from estimating the product observ-
ables in the decomposition. For different Ui, the same set
of product observables are measured, and the detail on Ui
only enters the QKD protocol in the coefficients in the de-
composition Eq. (10), and thus, the same set of product
observables can be used to calculate all possible ǫzi, and
the optimization over twisting operator is an entirely clas-
sical computation problem.
Similar analysis holds for P/M-QKD. Just like PPP-QKD,
the choice of Ui only enters the protocol via the classical
computation of the estimate ǫzi. Thus, Alice and Bob runs
the protocol as stated before, but now with extra minimiza-
tion of ǫzi over all possible Ui in their classical computation,
followed by the appropriate EC/PA procedure.
VII. Discussion
We have seen that for any channel which allows for the
distribution of key distillable states, there exists a proto-
col for verifying security. The protocol is related to the
scheme of Lo and Chau, the difference being that phase
errors become twisted phase errors, and are measured by
decomposing this operator in terms of product observables.
Accuracy of this procedure is due to the exponential quan-
tum de Finetti theorem [6] and the usual Chernoff bound
13
and sampling theory. Security of this protocol was proven
by reduction to the Lo-Chau proof of security. We then
converted it to a prepare and measure scheme which has
the advantage of not requiring quantum coherent control.
Furthermore, one can classically optimize over the twisting
operation to minimize the corresponding twisted phase er-
ror rate, and thus maximize the key rate. More generally,
each EPP-QKD protocol that involves parameter estima-
tion on a small fraction of sample systems and only com-
putational basis measurement and classical processing of
the data has a PPP-QKD analogue and a P/M-QKD ana-
logue. Paradoxically, though the heart of the security proof
relates to entanglement purification, it never needs to be
done in the actual protocol, nor is noiseless entanglement
needed in our scheme. In particular, our protocol can be
based on bound entangled states or binding entanglement
channels with zero entanglement rate or quantum capacity.
This demonstrates conceptually that quantum key distri-
bution is not equivalent to the ability to send quantum
information. The “information gain implies disturbance”
effect is strong enough to provide security even in such
noisy regime. It also means that the ability to perform
near perfect error correction on any logical space is unnec-
essary.
As a side result, the procedure outlined in the Appendix
can be of independent interesting – in particular, it follows
that the average value of an observable O on a large num-
ber of systems (without any underlying structure) can be
estimated by measuring a sublinear sample even if O has
to be measured indirectly in terms of a decomposition to
other observables (in our case product observables) that do
not necessary commute with O.
We have noted that some of the states or measurement
results are not used in the analysis. Further research will
exploit such data to improve on the key rate.
It will also be interesting to study the alternative protocol
based on state tomography discussed in Sec. I-E and [1]
and investigate possible advantages (such as that on the
key rate).
A big open question is whether all entangled states can be
converted via LOCC to pbits, and related to this question
is whether all binding entanglement channels can be used
for QKD.
Finally, our protocol is restricted to some classes of twisting
(e.g., tensor power twisting). It will be interesting to ei-
ther show the possibility of QKD in the case of completely
arbitrary twisting or to obtain a no-go theorem.
Appendix
I. LOCC estimation of the expectation of an IID
observable
A. Finite quantum de Finetti theorem and generalized
Chernoff bound
We say that a state ρn on Hilbert space H⊗n satisfies the
Chernoff bound with respect to a state σ on H and a mea-
surement M on H if (with high probability) the relative
frequency distribution obtained by measuringM⊗n on ρn is
close to that of measuringM on σ. For example, ρn = σ⊗n.
However many other states satisfy the same property. An
important class is called almost power states, which are for-
mulated and studied in [6]. We adapt results in [6] for our
own purpose in the following.
Theorem 1: (Finite quantum de Finetti theorem plus
Chernoff bound) Consider any permutationally invariant
(possibly mixed) state ρn+k on Hilbert space H⊗(n+k). Let
ρn = Trkρn+k be the partial trace of ρn+k over k systems.
Let 0 ≤ r ≤ n/2. Then there exists a probability measure
µ on (possibly mixed) states σ acting on H and a family of
states ρ
(σ)
n,r such that
1. The state ρn is close to a mixture of the states ρ
(σ)
n,r∥∥∥∥ρn −
∫
ρ(σ)n,r dµ(σ)
∥∥∥∥
tr
≤ 2 e− k(r+1)2(n+k)+ 12 dim(H)2 ln k (23)
2. The states ρ
(σ)
n,r (called almost power states) satisfy the
Chernoff bound in the following sense
Pr
(∥∥∥PM(σ)−QM[ρ(σ)n,r]∥∥∥ > δ)
≤ 2−n
h
δ
2
4 −H( rn )
i
+|W | log(n2 +1) =: e(δ) (24)
whereM={Mw}w∈W is any measurement on H, PM(σ) =
{Tr(σMw)}w, QM[ρ(σ)n,r] is the frequency distribution ob-
tained from measuring M⊗n on the state ρ(σ)n,r, and |W | is
the size of the alphabet W .
3. Reduced density matrices of the states ρ
(σ)
n,r (to n′ ≤ n
systems with r ≤ n′/2) satisfy the same Chernoff bound:
Pr(
∥∥∥PM(σ) −Q′M[ρ(σ)n,r,n′ ]∥∥∥ > δ)
≤ 2−n′
h
δ
2
4 −H( rn′ )
i
+|W | log(n
′
2 +1) (25)
where ρ
(σ)
n,r,n′ = Trn−n′ρ
(σ)
n,r is the resulting state after par-
tial tracing n−n′ systems from ρ(σ)n,r and Q′M[ρ(σ)n,r,n′ ] is the
frequency distribution obtained from measuring M⊗n′ on
the state ρ
(σ)
n,r,n′ .
Throughout the theorem, the probability is taken over the
actual measurement outcomes that defines the frequency
distributions. We also use [·] for frequency distributions
defined by measurement outcomes whenever appriopriate.
Proof: We first collect various facts, definitions, and results
from [6].
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A.1 Fact and definitions
Definition 4: Almost power state: (Def. 4.1.4, in [6])
Suppose 0 ≤ r ≤ n. Let Sym(H⊗n) denote the symmetric
subspace of pure states of Hilbert space H⊗n. Let |θ〉 ∈ H
be an arbitrary pure state and consider:
V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r) := {π(|θ〉⊗n−r ⊗ |ψr〉) : π ∈ Sn,
|ψr〉 ∈ H⊗r}
where Sn is the permutation group of the n systems. We
define the almost power states along |θ〉 to be the set of
pure states in
|θ〉[⊗,n,r] := Sym(H⊗n) ∩ span(V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗n−r)) (26)
We denote the set of mixtures of almost tensor power states
along |θ〉 as conv(|θ〉[⊗,n,r]).
With the above definition, we shall prove the following
lemma:
Lemma 1: If ̺n ∈ conv(|θ〉[⊗,n,r]), then, ̺n−m ∈
conv(|θ〉[⊗,n−m,r]) where ̺n−m = Trm(̺n) is the reduced
density matrix after the partial trace over any m out of
the n systems (by symmetry, without loss of generality, we
take the first m systems).
Proof .-
Since membership in conv(|θ〉[⊗,n−m,r]) is preserved un-
der mixing, it suffices to prove the lemma for pure ̺n =
|Ψn〉〈Ψn|, with |Ψn〉 ∈ |θ〉[⊗,n,r].
We can pick an ensemble realizing ̺n−m of our choice, and
prove the lemma by showing that any element |Ψn−m〉 in
that ensemble belongs to |θ〉[⊗,n−m,r]. Our ensemble is ob-
tained by an explicit partial trace of |Ψn〉 over the first m
subsystems along the computational basis. An element is
given by
|Ψn−m〉 = 〈i1|...〈im| ⊗ In−m|Ψn〉. (27)
Now, we note two facts:
(i) |Ψn−m〉 ∈ Sym(H⊗(n−m)), since |Ψn〉 ∈ Sym(H⊗n).
(ii) |Ψn−m〉 ∈ V(H⊗n−m, |θ〉⊗(n−m−r)) – This is because
|Ψn〉 ∈ V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗(n−r)), and expressing |Ψn〉 in terms of
the spanning vectors of V(H⊗n, |θ〉⊗(n−r)) and putting it
into Eq. (27), we have
|Ψn−m〉 =
∑
Ψr,π
αΨr,π〈i1| · · · 〈im|⊗In−m π (|θ〉⊗(n−r)⊗|Ψr〉).
Elementary analysis shows that any term of the
above sum is, up to permutation, of the form
(〈i1|θ〉) · · · (〈ip|θ〉)|θ〉⊗n−r−p ⊗ [〈ip+1| · · · 〈im| ⊗ Ir−(m−p) π′(|Ψr〉)]
where 0 ≤ p ≤ m, and “absorbing”m−p copies of θ to the
last part of the vector, we get |θ〉⊗n−(r+m) ⊗ |Ψ′′r 〉. Thus,
|Ψm−n〉 is a sum of terms of the form π(|θ〉⊗n−(r+m) ⊗
|Ψ′′r 〉), and belongs to V(H⊗(n−m), |θ〉⊗n−(r+m)). This
proves the second fact, and also the lemma. 
The next lemma asserts that a mixture of almost tensor
power states behaves approximately like a mixture of ten-
sor power states with respect to a generalized version of
Chernoff bound.
Lemma 2: (Theorem 4.5.2 of [6]) Let 0 ≤ r ≤ n2 ,
|θ〉 ∈ H, and |Ψn〉 be a vector from |θ〉[⊗,n,r]. Let
M = {Mw}w∈W be a POVM on H, PM(|θ〉〈θ|) be the
probability distribution generated by applying the mea-
surement to |θ〉〈θ| (i.e., PM(|θ〉〈θ|) = {Tr|θ〉〈θ|Mw}w), and
PM[|Ψn〉〈Ψn|] be the relative frequency distribution of out-
comes of M⊗n applied to |Ψn〉〈Ψn|. Then,
Pr
(‖PM(|θ〉〈θ|) − PM[|Ψn〉〈Ψn|] ‖ > δ)
≤ 2−n
h
δ
2
4 −H( rn )
i
+|W | log(n2 +1) =: e(δ)
where the probability is taken over the outcomes. Note
that we have used e(δ) instead of δ(e) in [6].
Consider the general probability Pr(‖PM(ρ) − PM[̺n]‖ <
δ) where PM[̺n] is a frequency distribution of outcomes
of M⊗n applied to |Ψn〉〈Ψn|. The distribution PM[̺n], if
treated as a functional of ̺n on the space H⊗n, is linear in
̺n. Following this we get immediately:
Corollary 1: Lemma 2 holds when replacing the projector
|Ψn〉〈Ψn| (for |Ψn〉 ∈ |θ〉[⊗,n,r]) by ̺n ∈ conv(|θ〉[⊗,n,r]).
Apart form the generalized Chernoff-type lemmas, we also
need the crucial exponential quantum finite de Finetti the-
orem:
Theorem 2 (Theorem 4.3.2 of [6]) For any pure state |ψn+k〉 ∈
Sym(H⊗n+k) and 0 ≤ r ≤ n there is a measure dν(|θ〉) on
H and for each |θ〉 ∈ H there is a pure state |ψ(θ)n 〉 ∈
|θ〉[⊗,n,r] such that∥∥∥∥Trk|ψn+k〉〈ψn+k| −
∫
H
|ψ(θ)n 〉〈ψ(θ)n |dν(|θ〉)
∥∥∥∥
tr
≤ 2e− k(r+1)2(n+k)+ 12 dim(H) ln k (28)
Finally, we need the fact that any permutationally invari-
ant state has a symmetric purification.
Lemma 3 (Lemma 4.2.2 of [6]) Let ρn be a permutation-
ally invariant state on H⊗n. Then there exists a purifica-
tion of the state in Sym((H⊗H)⊗n).
This concludes the list of facts and definitions needed for
proving Theorem 1.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Consider an arbitrary permutationally invariant state ̺n+k
on Hilbert space H⊗(n+k).
Step (1): According to Lemma 3 there is a purification
|ψn+k〉 that belongs to Sym(H′⊗n+k) where H′ = H ⊗ H˜
and dim(H˜) =dim(H).
Step (2): We apply Theorem 2 to |ψn+k〉 with the changes
H → H′ = H⊗ H˜
d → d2 (29)
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Step (3): After application of theorem 2 we perform par-
tial trace over H˜⊗n, the purifying space introduced in step
(1). We denote this partial trace by T˜r. This partial trace
induces from the measure for pure state on H′ in step (2) a
new measure µ(σ) on the set of all mixed states σ acting on
H. (The probability of σ is given by the total probability of
all |θ〉 with T˜r(|θ〉〈θ|) = σ). This partial trace produces also
the states ρ
(σ)
n,r defined directly by ρ
(σ)
n,r ≡ T˜r(|ψ(θ)n 〉〈ψ(θ)n |)
where the existence of the pure states |ψ(θ)n 〉 is guaranteed
by Theorem 2. Finally we note that partial trace does not
increase the trace distance between two quantum states, so
applying partial trace to the LHS of (28) and using the no-
tation described above we get immediately the inequality
(23). This proves the first item of Theorem (1).
To prove the second item of Theorem (1), remember from
the above that ρ
(σ)
n,r ≡ T˜r(|ψ(θ)n 〉〈ψ(θ)n |). Since |ψ(θ)n 〉 is an
almost power pure state, lemma 2 applies. Further, it holds
for all POVM-s on H′ = H ⊗ H˜, and in particular for
incomplete POVM-s acting only on H but not on H˜. Thus,
the conclusion of lemma 2 holds with the change: M →
M⊗ I, which gives item (2).
Finally, to prove item 3 of theorem 1, note that the re-
duced density matrices ̺σn,r,n′ of interest can be obtained
from the pure state |ψ(θ)n 〉 above by tracing (i) first over
n−n′ subsystems corresponding to H′, producing a state
on H′⊗n′ , and (ii) then over n′ subsystems corresponding
to H˜.
Then lemma 1 guarantees that the first partial trace pro-
duces a mixed state ̺n′ in conv(|θ〉[⊗,n′,n′−r]) (with under-
lying space H′. Applying corollary 1 to ̺n′ with n′ instead
of n, it suffices to consider a pure state in |θ〉[⊗,n′,n′−r].
Finally, lemma 2 can be applied to this pure state with
M→M⊗ I which concludes item 3. 
B. Two other useful results
B.1 Classical random sampling
In addition to the fact and definitions above and Theorem
1, we will need the following result on classical random
sampling (or equivalently symmetric probability distribu-
tion).
Proposition 1: (Classical sampling theory) Lemma
A.4 from [23]. Let Z be an n-tuple and Z ′ a k-tuple of
random variables over a set Z, with symmetric joint prob-
ability PZZ′ . Let Qz′ be the relative frequency distribution
of a fixed sequence z′ and Q(z,z′) be the relative frequency
distribution of a sequence (z, z′), drawn according to PZZ′ .
Then for every ǫ ≥ 0 we have
Pr
ZZ′
(||Q(z,z′) −Qz′ || ≥ ǫ) ≤ |Z| e−kǫ
2/8|Z|. (30)
The result says that the relative frequency distribution ob-
tained from a small sample is close to one obtained from
the whole system. (This lemma is similar to Eq. (6), but
stronger in two respects – it applies to any dimension and
has no restriction on the fraction sampled. On the other
hand, Eq. (6) has better constants in the exponent.)
B.2 From probabilities to averages
Lemma 4: Consider an observable L on Hilbert space H,
dimH = d. Let L = ∑ti=1 siLi, where {Li} is a trace or-
thonormal basis for operators (i.e., TrLiL
†
j = δij). Let the
eigenvalues of Li be denoted by λ
(i)
l . Consider an arbitrary
state ρ, and let P (i) = {p(i)l } be the probability distribu-
tion on l (which eigenvalue) induced by measuring Li on
ρ. Let Q(i) = {q(i)l } be an arbitrary family of distributions
on the eigenvalues of Li. We then have∣∣∣∣∣〈L〉ρ −
∑
i
si
∑
l
λ
(i)
l q
(i)
l
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ √t ‖L‖HS maxi ‖P
(i) −Q(i)‖tr (31)
where ‖ · ‖HS is the Hilbert-Schmidt norm and ‖ · ‖tr is the
trace norm.
Proof ∣∣∣∣∣〈L〉ρ −
∑
i
si
∑
l
λ
(i)
l q
(i)
l
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i
si
∑
l
λ
(i)
l (p
(i)
l −q(i)l )
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
i
|si|
(
max
l
|λ(i)l |
) ‖P (i) −Q(i)‖tr
=
∑
i
|si| ‖Li‖∞ ‖P (i) −Q(i)‖tr
≤ (max
i
‖P (i) −Q(i)‖tr
)∑
j
|sj | ‖Lj‖∞ (32)
where ‖ · ‖∞ is the operator norm. Since ||Li||∞ ≤ 1, using
convexity of x2 we obtain
t∑
j=1
|sj | ‖Lj‖∞ ≤
∑
j
|sj| ≤
√
t
√∑
j
s2j =
√
t ‖L‖HS (33)
This completes the proof. 
C. Estimation - detailed description
We consider 2m+n systems with Hilbert space H⊗(2m+n),
dimH = d in a permutationally invariant state ̺2m+n.
Suppose the ultimate goal is to obtain the “empirical mean-
value” of some single-system observable Σ on a sample
of n + m systems. In other words, we want to measure
1
N
∑N
j=1 Σ
(j) where Σ(j) = I ⊗ I ⊗ · · · ⊗Σ⊗ · · · ⊗ I on the
N subsystems for N = n+m.
Because of experimental limitations (here, it is the LOCC
constraints on Alice and Bob), they are restricted to mea-
suring product operators of the form L = LA ⊗ LB by
independently finding the eigenvalues of LA and LB (i.e.,
making the measurements LA ⊗ I and I ⊗ LB), discussing
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over classical channels and multiplying their outcomes to-
gether. Now, to measure Σ, one can first rewrite it in terms
of product operators Li:
Σ =
t∑
i=1
siLi (34)
where we have chosen {Li} to be hermitian and trace or-
thonormal, so that si are real. The Li-s are “intermediate
observables.” We will describe an inference scheme that (1)
involves only the estimation of the “empirical mean-value”
of Σ on a small number (m) of subsystems, and (2) the
measurement of Σ is done indirectly via measurements of
the Li’s.
The analysis will start with a special assumption about
the 2m-element sample, m of which are used for indirect
estimation. The assumptions are relaxed on that sample.
After that properties of the other m + n subsystems are
inferred.
C.1 Analysis of the 2m sample in an “almost power state
along σ”:̺
(σ)
2m,r
Suppose the first 2m subsystems are in a joint state ̺
(σ)
2m,r,
with r ≤ 12 × 2m. We expect the state ̺(σ)2m,r to play a role
similar to the state σ⊗2m. Define the theoretical direct
average
〈Σ〉σ = Tr(Σσ) =
∑
i
si〈Li〉σ (35)
We now consider an indirect measurement of Σ applied
on the first m subsystems, and a direct measurement on
the next m subsystems. We will show that the empirical
average, either obtained directly or indirectly, will be close
to the above.
For the indirect measurement, divide the first m subsys-
tems into t groups. Each group has m′ = m/t subsys-
tems. Alice and Bob take the ith group (i = 1, · · · , t) and
measure Li on each site as described above (the measure-
ment is Li). In other words, the measurement M indirect =
⊗ti=1(L⊗m
′
i ) is applied to the first m subsystems of the en-
tire 2m+ n subsystems.
We expect ̺
(σ)
2m,r and σ
⊗m to behave similarly. In partic-
ular, consider an observable Li =
∑
l λ
(i)
l |ψ(i)l 〉〈ψ(i)l | ex-
pressed in its spectral decomposition and the probability
distribution on the set of eigenvalues Ai induced by the
state σ as follows:
Pi = {Tr(σ|ψ(i)l 〉〈ψ(i)l |)}l (36)
An execution of the measurement L⊗m′i gives a particular
outcome (l1, ..., lm′) and induces a relative frequency dis-
tribution Qi on Ai.
Then, the empirical frequency distributions Qi is close to
the “theoretical” distribution Pi:
Fact 1:
Pr(‖Pi −Qi‖tr ≥ δ) ≤ e(δ,m′, r, d), (37)
where the probability is taken over the measurement out-
comes, d is the dimension of the single site Hilbert space,
and
e(δ, n, r, |Z|) := 2−( δ
2
4 −H( rn ))n+|Z| log(n2+1) (38)
Proof - Follows immediately from the third item of Theo-
rem 1. Note that we use item (3) not (2) since we perform
the measurement only on part of the state ̺
(σ)
2m,r.
Remark - Note also that Pi is constant while Qi is a random
variable.
Now, we define the theoretical average values for the inter-
mediate observables Li’s:
〈Li〉σ = Tr(Liσ) (39)
and the empirical averages
〈Li〉emp =
∑
l
λ
(i)
l Qi(l) (40)
where Qi(l) denotes the value of Qi on a specific event
l in the alphabet Ai. (Again, 〈Li〉σ is constant while
〈Li〉emp is a random variable depending on the particu-
lar outcomes of the measurements, and recall that Li =∑
i λ
(i)
l |ψ(i)l 〉〈ψ(i)l |). Denote the empirical value of Σ ob-
tained indirectly via the empirical averages of the Li’s by
〈Σ〉(m),indemp =
∑
i
si〈Li〉emp . (41)
We now show that the indirect empirical average is close to
the direct theoretical average in Eq. (35). First applying
the union bound to Fact 1, we get
Pr(∪i=1,...,t{‖Pi −Qi‖tr > δ}) ≤ t · e(δ,m′, r, d) (42)
Then using Lemma 4 we obtain that
Pr
(∣∣∣〈Σ〉σ − 〈Σ〉(m),indemp ∣∣∣ > δ)
= Pr
(∣∣∣∣∣
t∑
i
si〈Li〉σ −
t∑
i
si〈Li〉emp
∣∣∣∣∣ > δ
)
≤ t · e
(
δ
‖Σ‖HS
√
t
,m′, r, d
)
. (43)
We emphasize once again that the probabilities are taken
over the measurement outcomes.
After considering the indirect measurements, suppose that
someone measures directly Mdirect = 1m
∑2m
j=m+1 Σ
(j) on
the second group of m subsystems. Denote the empirical
average outcome by 〈Σ〉(m),diremp . In a way similar to the in-
direct case (but much easier here) we show that the empir-
ical direct average is close to 〈Σ〉σ in Eq. (35) (by applying
Lemma 4 with t = 1):
Pr
(∣∣∣〈Σ〉σ − 〈Σ〉(m),diremp ∣∣∣ > δ) ≤ e( δ‖Σ‖HS ,m, r, d
)
. (44)
From the inequalities (43), (44) we obtain
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Lemma 5: For the measurements on the state ̺
(σ)
2m,r con-
sidered above we have:
Pr
(∣∣∣〈Σ〉(m),diremp − 〈Σ〉(m),indemp ∣∣∣ > 2δ)
≤ t · e
(
δ
‖Σ‖HS
√
t
,m′, r, d
)
+ e
(
δ
‖Σ‖HS ,m, r, d
)
≤ (t+ 1) · e
(
δ
‖Σ‖HS
√
t
,m′, r, d
)
(45)
where the probability is taken over measurement outcomes.
Proof .- Here triangle inequality and union bound to in-
equalities (43), (44) suffices together with the properties
of e(δ, n, r, d). Note that the indirect and direct measure-
ments are performed on disjoint subsystems, so that there
is a probability space for the joint outcomes.
C.2 Passing from ̺
(σ)
2m,r-s to their integrals and then to a
close-by state
Note that both integration and the measurement of a
state to produce the classical distribution of the outcomes
are both linear, completely positive, and trace-preserving
maps. Thus, Lemma 5 still holds under the replacement
̺
(σ)
2m,r →
∫
̺
(σ)
2m,rdµ(σ). Furthermore, if
∥∥∥∥̺2m −
∫
̺
(σ)
2m,rdµ(σ)
∥∥∥∥
tr
≤ ǫ . (46)
We can use the fact that the trace distance is nonincreasing
under the measurement (a TCP map) to prove the follow-
ing:
Lemma 6: For a state ̺2m of 2m systems satisfying ‖̺2m−∫
̺
(σ)
2m,rdµ(σ)‖tr ≤ ǫ we have
Pr
(∣∣∣〈Σ〉(m),diremp − 〈Σ〉(m),indemp ∣∣∣ > 2δ)
≤ (t+ 1) · e
(
δ
‖Σ‖HS
√
t
,m′, r, d
)
+ ǫ . (47)
where the probability is evaluated over the probability dis-
tribution P ′ on outcomes of measurement L⊗m′1 ⊗ ... ⊗
L⊗m′t ⊗M⊗m induced by the state ̺2m.
C.3 Inferring direct average on n + m samples of general
state ̺2m+n from indirect measurements onm samples
Now we pass to the general permutationally invariant state
̺2m+n. We have the following:
Theorem 3: Consider permutationally invariant state ̺2m+n
on H⊗2m+n and dimH = d. On this state we perform the
measurement L⊗m′1 ⊗ · · · ⊗L⊗m
′
t ⊗M⊗m+n which induces
the probability measure P ′′. (Note that P ′ is simply the
marginal of P ′′.) Evaluating the probability over P ′′, we
have
Pr(|〈Σ〉(m),indemp − 〈Σ〉(m+n)emp )| > 3δ) ≤ e1 + e2 + e3 (48)
where
e1 = 2e
− n(r+1)
2(2m+n)
+ 12d
2 lnn
e2 = (t+ 1)2
−( δ2
4t||Σ||2
HS
−H( r
m′
))m′+d log(m
′
2 +1)
and
e3 = de
− mδ2
8d||Σ||2
HS . (49)
Proof - The parameters e1, e2, e3 come from the generalized
quantum de Finetti theorem, the Chernoff bound and the
sampling proposition respectively.
To start, we apply item (1) of Theorem 1 to ̺2m =
Trn̺2m+n to obtain ‖̺2m −
∫
̺
(σ)
2m,rdµ(σ)‖tr ≤ ǫ with
ǫ = e1. Then, we apply Lemma 6 to get
Pr (|〈Σ〉(m),diremp − 〈Σ〉(m),indemp | > 2δ) ≤ e1 + e2 (50)
Now we need to connect 〈Σ〉(m),indemp with 〈Σ〉(m+n)emp . For
this we need the fact that M has at most d outcomes,
and we need the random sampling theorem, Proposition 1,
which gives Pr (‖QmΣ − Qm+nΣ ‖tr > δ) ≤ de−mδ
2/8d where
QmΣ is the relative frequency distribution on outputs ofM
induced by the state ρm (partial trace of ρ2m+n over m+n
systems and Qm+nΣ is the relative frequency distribution
induced on the outcomes of M by the state ρm+n (partial
trace of ρ2m+n over m systems) and d is the dimension
of the elementary Hilbert space H (thus ̺2m is defined on
H⊗2m. Using Lemma 4 (taking t = 1 here for the direct
measurement) we go to the averages
Pr (|〈Σ〉(m),diremp − 〈Σ〉(m+n)emp | > 3δ) ≤ e3. (51)
Applying the union bound to Eqs. (50) and (51) we obtain
the statement of the theorem.
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